Al-Manassa continues its coverage of the “Towards a Solution” initiative, which aims to clarify the pathways proposed by the United Nations Support Mission’s (UNSMIL) Advisory Committee. In this report, we present the key takeaways from an extensive interview conducted by journalist Zainab Tarbah with Dr. Abeir Imneina, a member of the Advisory Committee and an academic at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Benghazi University, focusing on the second and third pathways.
Pathway Two: Mechanisms and Guarantees
Pathway two, put forth by the Advisory Committee for resolving the Libyan crisis, proposes the election of a bicameral legislative council within two years. The Senate would be tasked with drafting and ratifying the constitution, which would then govern future presidential and parliamentary elections. Addressing questions regarding the necessary guarantees for the new legislative council to fulfill its duties, and the rationale for proposing an elected legislative body to draft and conduct a referendum on a new constitution, Dr. Imneina explained that Libya’s political experiences have demonstrated a lack of trust in any form of guarantees. She elaborated that any forthcoming political settlement, regardless of its structure, must explicitly incorporate these guarantees or have them defined by the international community, which should also endorse the new government. While the selection of this new government might itself serve as a guarantor, simply declaring guarantees is easy, and they can be readily circumvented, with ample historical evidence to support this. She also called on the Libyan populace to actively engage and become guarantors, noting that 14 years have passed in the country’s history without the public effectively exercising its oversight role.
Discussing the expected role of the Libyan people as guarantors, Imneina affirmed the legitimacy and urgency of the question of guarantees, yet highlighted their persistent fragility within Libya’s political reality. She underscored that any political settlement must include these guarantees, emphasizing the international community’s role in endorsing and legitimising any new political outcome. She expressed regret that in the current Libyan context, the international community and the parties involved in the conflict serve as the true guarantors of the agreements’ implementation, more so than local actors. She urged the Libyan people to assume their civic responsibility through popular pressure, continuous monitoring, and civil activism to prevent a repeat of past experiences where 14 years were squandered without tangible results. Imneina added that the international community, ostensibly a major guarantor of the political process, is regrettably a party to the conflict, and thus must genuinely commit to ending internal strife. She insisted that the Libyan citizen must be the primary guarantor of the political process through popular oversight, active follow-up, the exercise of electoral voice, and informed criticism in public forums – asserting these are all necessities, not mere options. She pointed out that an electoral path aiming to build a genuine state cannot be left solely to elites or international powers; instead, the people must participate, as they constitute the foundation that no political disagreements can dismantle.
Ethical Pledges and the Constitutional Framework
Regarding breached pledges, specifically the ethical commitment by the head of the Government of National Unity not to run in elections – a pledge subsequently violated on the pretext of it being “merely ethical” – Imneina questioned whether a legally binding commitment could be relied upon. She countered that an ethical pledge should inherently be definitive and legally enforceable, maintaining that guarantees are consistently present and agreed upon, but political experience has exposed loopholes. To overcome this impasse, she advocated for establishing a robust constitutional framework that cannot be circumvented. She added that every attempt to stabilise the political structure reveals vulnerabilities or “sustainability outlets,” which ultimately render these commitments unstable. Consequently, the absence of a solid constitutional basis renders pledges, whether ethical or political, ineffectual.
Why a New Body for Constitutional Drafting?
Concerning the proposal to form a new body for drafting the constitution or assigning this task to it, despite an elected Constituent Assembly having already completed a draft awaiting a public referendum, Imneina explained that the legitimacy of the current draft constitution has significantly deteriorated and is now at risk, particularly after Amendment 12 effectively nullified the role and legal legitimacy of the constitutional drafting committee, along with all pending issues related to the constitutional process. She indicated that the prevailing view leans towards holding a referendum on an existing constitution or reopening it for review, citing numerous problems associated with the constitution and differing viewpoints among the Constituent Assembly members. She clarified that the current draft faced challenges and was subsequently handed over to the legislator, who then abrogated the provisions governing the constitutional process, thereby opening the door for the constitutional question to be approached from a different perspective. She noted that Pathway Three focuses on the constitutional process, addressing how the constitutional momentum might be reignited, either through a referendum on the current draft or by reopening it and tackling contentious issues within it. Pathway Three, which the Advisory Committee arrived at, aims for a constitution to be reached and put to a referendum before any elections take place.
Distinctions Between Pathway Two and Three
Regarding the difference between the two pathways – where Pathway Two assigned the task of drafting the constitution to the newly elected legislative council, while Pathway Three entails reaching a constitution and holding a referendum on it before elections – Imneina described Pathway Three as “difficult.” This difficulty, she explained, stems from its requirement for a genuine political settlement and the necessity of persuading existing institutions to conduct a constitutional referendum, which in turn demands the unification of these institutions to reopen or re-present the constitutional issue. She reiterated the complexity of this process, noting that the draft has been ready since 2017 but has seen no progress; indeed, it has regrettably been exploited to obstruct any electoral process. She clarified that Abdul Hamid Dabaiba (head of the Government of National Unity) treats the matter of elections by linking it to the constitution, yet he disregards the constitutional issue once pressures subside. Imneina concluded that this constitutes the fundamental difference between the two pathways, considering the implementation of Pathway Three extremely challenging, as eight years have yielded no results. She anticipated facing the problem of assigning referendum tasks given the persistence of existing bodies, which must ultimately oversee and implement the referendum. She concluded by stating that Pathway Three is a “dead end” and was “stillborn” from its inception.
Justification for Pathway Three’s Existence Despite Its Difficulties
Despite her preceding assessment, Imneina clarified that Pathway Three’s existence is necessary because it is important to discuss the draft, regardless of the difficulties in realising it. Furthermore, it holds importance out of respect for the committee that worked diligently and completed a significant portion of it. She alluded to the possibility of re-discussing certain aspects. She deemed it unjust not to acknowledge this pathway, as a surprise might occur. A referendum could take place under pressure from the existing institutions, whether through a threat of their departure or their eventual dissolution.
Are Elections Before a Constitutional Referendum More Appropriate?
Imneina emphatically asserted the paramount importance of moving towards elections before a constitutional referendum, a position she has held since the Geneva dialogue, despite acknowledging that a constitutional referendum is foundational. However, she stressed that necessity dictates proceeding with elections given the current institutional landscape and existing polarisations. She expressed regret that any opinion aligning with a political party’s interest is often “demonised,” reaffirming her preference for a constitution, as it would significantly streamline many processes. She lamented that while she had hoped for the constitutional process to be put forward, dealing with the constitutional referendum issue had consistently hindered the political process, which she deemed unfortunate.
Public Demands and the Judiciary’s Role
Regarding recent public demands from demonstrations in Tripoli, which included handing over authority to the Supreme Court or the High Judicial Council, establishing a caretaker government, and holding a constitutional referendum, Imneina confirmed that this option was indeed raised in the Advisory Committee’s workshops. However, most legal experts participating deemed it essential to completely insulate the judiciary from the political process to preserve its impartiality and independence. The idea of transferring authority to the head of the National Security Council was also proposed, as an undivided entity reporting to the House of Representatives and maintaining communication with the western government. However, she stressed that these proposals remained within general discussion and were not adopted as formal options within the pathways, as the objective was to focus on alternatives based on existing or potentially formable institutions through political consensus, rather than solutions entirely outside the institutional framework.
Amended Kingdom Constitution and UNSMIL’s Role
Concerning the public’s preference for quicker solutions, and the perception that two years is a lengthy period that could extend further, leading some to propose resorting to the amended Kingdom Constitution, Imneina explained that this option was initially raised “tentatively,” possibly due to unsuitable timing. At that point, options had not yet fully crystallised, and the committee was primarily focused on dissecting complex issues. Consequently, it was quickly presented but not formally included among the recommendations.
As for the role of the United Nations mission during the workshops, and whether it was an influential party or merely an observer, especially amidst accusations of its derailing Libya from the constitutional path, Imneina asserted that within the Advisory Committee’s work, the mission served only a logistical and organisational role and did not interfere with the substance of discussions or decisions. She clarified that the committee itself formed the drafting committee and was responsible for writing meeting minutes and final drafts, and that the mission was available solely to provide technical assistance. However, she acknowledged that during meetings with the 6+6 committee, a direct accusation was levelled against the mission, asserting that it had become a party to the conflict rather than a neutral entity. This accusation was explicitly raised by some members of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State, as well as in civil society meetings with them abroad. Nevertheless, she confirmed that their committee’s work experienced no actual interference; on the contrary, the committee proposed alternative pathways to the legal ones put forth by the 6+6 committee through a purely Libyan initiative and without any guidance from the mission.
To be continued: Pathway Four…