Tripoli appears to be bracing for a potential new conflict, with escalating tensions between the Government of National Unity’s (GNU) security apparatus and Al Radaa Force, led by Abdul Rauf Kara. Recent statements by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah have sparked widespread concern about a renewed outbreak of armed hostilities, particularly as they directly targeted specific individuals and entities.
Extending state authority: Dbeibah’s uncompromising stance
Dbeibah’s remarks unequivocally stated that there is “no longer room for the ‘Haj’ or ‘Sheikh’,” emphasising that he was referring to specific entities and individuals. He added that the terms “Sheikh” and “Haj” demean the Libyan state and its components, questioning disapprovingly: “How can we bring a ‘Haj’ or ‘Sheikh’ from the mosque and call him a president?”
Dbeibah asserted that the state does not fight Salafism as a methodology but respects it. Instead, they oppose outlaws who use “Sheikh” and “Haj” descriptions to undermine the state.
He stressed that no airport, port, or prison would remain outside state control in the future, pointing out that the Public Prosecutor had issued 125 arrest warrants against individuals located in Mitiga.
“They imprison people for 7 or 8 years, then release them by force of arms… Who are you to both imprison and release at the same time?” Dbeibah stated.
He added, “The criminal wants to impose his control, and I previously indicated that there’s no room to differentiate between the state and this criminal. Today, we say it’s either the police and state institutions or the criminals.”
He indicated that their policy is clear: to subject all crossings, airports, and ports to regular state agencies, stressing their continuation of the security operation to “extend state authority” even if it means repeated armed clashes.
“When I spoke of clashes, I was addressing the Ministry of Interior, and I meant friction and clashes between policemen and criminals. This friction and clash between police and criminals must happen,” Dbeibah explained.
Dbeibah outlined four conditions to avert war against “armed groups”: first, the handover of “criminals” sheltering in Mitiga to the Public Prosecutor; second, the liberation of Mitiga Airport and its subjugation to the Ministry of Transport; third, the subjugation of the prison from which ISIS members were released to state authority; and fourth, the permanent disbandment of militias and the integration of those willing to join regular state agencies. “I cannot guarantee what will happen to whoever rejects these conditions, and the message is clear to everyone,” Dbeibah declared.
Al Radaa Force dissolution: A contested decree amid military escalation
These statements have placed Al Radaa Special Deterrence Force for Combating Terrorism and Organised Crime at risk of dissolution amid a charged security atmosphere and increasing military mobilisation. Notably, Dbeibah issued a decision last May to dissolve the force, a decision RADA rejected, arguing that it falls “under the jurisdiction of the Presidential Council, as it was the body that issued the decision to establish the force.” Al Radaa also deemed the decision “selective, as it targets specific security bodies over others, referring to armed formations affiliated with Misrata city that are active in the capital, Tripoli,” according to media sources quoting the force.
Article One of Dbeibah’s decision concerning “amending the structure of the Ministry of Interior and stipulating certain provisions” stipulated the creation of a new department within the Ministry called the General Directorate for Combating Organised Crime, with the same competencies as the “Al Radaa Force.” Article Two stipulated the dissolution of the force, “transferring its competencies to the newly established directorate, and transferring all its fixed and movable assets and all its security and administrative personnel to the Ministry of Interior.”
In response, Al Radaa Force laid out its counter-conditions for handing over Mitiga base and wanted individuals, most notably Dbeibah’s submission to investigation by the Public Prosecutor’s office regarding corruption cases. This response reflects the force’s refusal to submit to Dbeibah’s terms.
Prisoner releases and judicial oversight: Public disputes intensify
Public disagreements between the GNU and Al Radaa Force escalated over the conditions of detainees in Mitiga Prison after the Ministry of Justice announced the release of dozens of prisoners whose detention was deemed unlawful. The ministry described this move as “correcting violations and restoring judicial sovereignty.”
The Ministry announced the release of a number of detainees whose detention was found to violate legal procedures, based on the findings of a prisoner review committee formed by the Public Prosecutor.
The Ministry affirmed that those for whom previous release orders had been issued but not executed were freed, and the status of those who had completed their sentences was settled. It emphasised “the impermissibility of continuing to detain any person after the completion of their sentence” and that judicial sessions would be scheduled for those held in pre-trial detention for long periods without trial.
The statement stressed “the state’s commitment to ending the excesses of law enforcement officers and armed formations, and subjecting all detention facilities to judicial authority,” affirming “the continuation of building a state of law that redresses injustice, holds transgressors accountable, and ensures swift and transparent justice.”
Review of prisoner conditions: Public Prosecution’s detailed findings
In parallel, the Public Prosecution announced the completion of reviewing the conditions of several inmates at the “Tripoli Reform and Rehabilitation Institution” and the “Al Radaa Special Deterrence Force,” as part of correcting detention conditions and ensuring respect for legal procedures.
The Public Prosecutor had previously issued a decision to form a special committee to review the conditions of inmates in both institutions, to verify the legality of their detention, and implement release orders issued by investigative bodies. The review procedures yielded the following findings:
* 2016-2021 Period: Al Radaa Force referred 3,179 reports to the Public Prosecution. The Public Prosecution followed up on release procedures for 3,975 individuals during these years, including those whose criminal proceedings were terminated, those covered by amnesty decisions, or those released due to COVID-19 pandemic measures.
* 2022: Al Radaa Force referred 794 reports, and the Public Prosecution ordered the release of 610 defendants, with the force executing the release orders.
* 2023: Al Radaa Force referred 1,147 reports. After examination, the Public Prosecution ordered the release of 611 defendants, with the force executing the release orders.
* 2024: Al Radaa Force referred 1,045 reports. The Public Prosecution decided to release 524 defendants, and the release orders issued were found to have been executed.
* First Half of 2025: Al Radaa Force referred 369 reports. Upon investigation, the Public Prosecution ordered the release of 258 defendants, and the release orders for them were found to have been executed.
In the context of the committee’s tasks, it reviewed the conditions of 192 individuals, concluding by recommending the release of 35 defendants for legal reasons or due to sentence completion, expediting trial procedures for the remainder, and initiating deportation procedures for 7 foreign nationals.
The conditions of 8 individuals accused of activities by transnational organised groups, including the kidnapping of Italian and Turkish expatriates, and contributing to the planning of armed activity in some neighbouring countries, were also reviewed. Al Radaa Force commenced hearing their statements, and the Public Prosecution set Sunday, July 13, 2025, as the date to consider the facts attributed to them.
Upon reviewing the committee’s findings, the Public Prosecutor emphasised the necessity of observing the controls of both substantive and territorial jurisdiction; following procedural legality governing the timings of inquiry and referral to the investigative authority; and directed his agents to complete investigations within reasonable times. Thus, the Public Prosecution completed processing the conditions of all individuals included in the decision to establish the committee, according to its statement.
Al Radaa’s counter-stance: Defending with data, refuting Dbeibah’s claims
In response, Al Radaa Force, led by Abdul Rauf Kara, defended its position, stating that “the Public Prosecutor, in his capacity as the Secretary-General of the public prosecution, has laid the truth before public opinion with full transparency,” presenting figures and data on the reality of the main “Tripoli Reform and Rehabilitation Institution,” and providing clarifications that “refute the claims raised about Mitiga Prison.”
In this regard, former Deputy Foreign Minister Hassan Al-Saghir commented on the Public Prosecutor’s office statement regarding the formation of a committee to verify the conditions of prisoners in Al Radaa’s prisons, considering that the Public Prosecutor “discredited Dbeibah and refuted his misleading information.”
Al-Saghir stated, “With figures and dates, the Public Prosecutor discredits Dbeibah and refutes his misleading information, putting him in a shameful position, even if shame and Dbeibah are two sides of the same coin.”
Dbeibah’s reliance on militias: Fears of illegitimate escalation
For his part, the member of the High Council of State, Balqasim Qzayt, stated that “most of what was said is logical and any future government would demand it. The problem is that Dbeibah himself relies on militias that are not very different from those he threatens to eradicate, and such work requires solid legitimacy, which the current government lacks.”
He pointed out that the GNU, through its actions, has turned all its allies into adversaries and enemies, adding: “In any case, we encourage discussion and demands, and reject the use of armed force.”
Provoking Al Radaa Force: Predictions of fierce conflict
Meanwhile, State Council member Saad bin Sharada affirmed that “there are no real institutions in western Libya, whether police or military, whose loyalty is to their institutions. Instead, they are influential regional groups, and Al Radaa Force sees itself like other groups affiliated with the Ministries of Interior and Defense, and will not surrender easily except by force of arms.”
He stressed that “Al Radaa forces differ from the Stability Support Apparatus led by Al-Kakali because its environment and social base are different. The Souk Al-Jumaa area, where it is based, operates as one family, and therefore ending Al Radaa will not be in its favour, especially after the experience of security breaches that occurred in Abu Salim area after what happened to the Stability Support Apparatus,” he estimated.
He added: “Until this moment, there are no state institutions, nor is there even a state, because the state is people and institutions, and all our institutions are groups, and the people are divided east and west.”
Political analyst Ibrahim Belqasim echoed this sentiment, stating that Dbeibah’s statements aim to provoke Al Radaa Force into any military operations when he gave the force a deadline to hand over Mitiga Airport, prisons, and wanted individuals in its custody.
He noted that the security agencies affiliated with the GNU are currently mobilising and are nearly ready for battle against Al Radaa Force.
Academic Imad Al-Hasak also affirmed that “if Dbeibah attempts to impose the security reality he seeks by force through his loyal armed groups, the capital Tripoli will inevitably enter armed confrontations that will be the fiercest since the clashes that occurred in 2011, and no one can predict their end or their political, security, and economic outcomes. It could also be the beginning of the end of his government, and opposing forces and armed groups might ally with each other, leading us into a long-term war.”
Between Dbeibah’s escalatory statements, the Ministry of Justice’s stance and actions, and Al Radaa’s rejection, fears are escalating of a slide into a new war whose outcomes and scale of losses cannot be predicted.
